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Guilty by Association: Inadequacies in the
Uniform Probate Code Slayer Statute
I. INTRODUCTION
When Steven Benson murdered his mother, Margaret Benson,
and brother, Scott Benson, Florida's slayer statute precluded him
from participating in either estate.' Carol Benson Kendall, daugh-
ter and sister of the victims, subsequently filed a petition to deter-
mine the beneficiaries in the probate estates of her testate mother
and her intestate brother.2 If Steven were allowed to inherit, he
would be profiting from his wrongful act.3 What remained at issue,
however, was whether Steven's children were also precluded from
taking due to their familial relationship to the killer.4 Here, the an-
swer is less clear. Do we disqualify Steven's children from their
shares of the victims' estates simply for being related to the killer?
Or do we view the children as innocent individuals who should not
be punished for their relationship to the wrongdoer?
This case presents a unique factual situation.5 Previous case
law addressed the question of whether a killer could benefit from
the victim's estate. 6 While this remains a controversial issue, juris-
dictions across the nation have begun to question the extent to
which the family of a killer should forfeit their interests in the vic-
tim's estate as a result of the killer's wrongful act. 7 New York is one
of several jurisdictions that has been forced to address this
question.
8
This note examines the consequences that the killer's wrongful
act has on his family members with regards to their inheritance





6 Rosemarie Talio Weber, Comment, Thomas v. Evans: A Missed Opportu-
nity to Fully Articulate Missouri's Slayer Rule in Changing Times, 12 QUINNIPIAC
PROB. L.J. 361 (1998). See, e.g., Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).
7 See, e.g., In re Estates of Covert, 717 N.Y.S.2d 392 (3d Dep't 2000), re-
versed 761 N.E.2d 571 (2001) (holding that parents of the slayer were not barred
from taking under the victim's estate).
8 See Bierbrauer v. Moran, 279 N.Y.S. 176 (4th Dep't [935); see also In re
Estates of Covert, 761 N.E.2d at 571.
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rights from the victim. Part I-A of this note outlines the law in this
area by discussing the development of the slayer rule. 9 Part I-B ex-
plores the basic principles and policies underlying the slayer rule. 10
Part I-C examines the narrowness of the rule and the different cate-
gories of killers that are excluded under its definition of a slayer.'1
Next, part I-A examines the inadequacy of the current Uniform
Probate Code slayer statute for its failure to specifically state
whether a slayer's family members are also precluded from taking
under the victim's estate. 12 In addition, part II-B explains why
prohibiting a slayer's family members from taking their rightful
shares of the victim's estate fails to recognize the relationship be-
tween the slayer rule and its underlying policies and principles.
13
Finally, part I-C examines and discounts various arguments in sup-
port of denying a killer's family members their shares of the vic-
tim's estate. 14 Part III suggests that these unique circumstances, and
the lack of a definitive statutory provision to address them, make it
necessary for the Uniform Probate Code to add a provision to its
current slayer statute that explicitly addresses the rights of a killer's
family. 15 Therefore, courts are forced to engage in a fact-specific
analysis in order to reach an equitable decision. Simply allowing an
extension of the slayer rule results in inequitable decisions that con-
tradict the slayer rule's purpose and founding principles. Also, such
an application would often violate the victim's wishes by excluding
rightful and intended beneficiaries. 16 The Note concludes, in Part
IV, that in order to maintain the slayer rule's founding principles
and policies and the current narrow definition of those precluded
from taking under the victim's estate, courts and legislatures should
not bar family members of the killer from taking under the victim's
estate simply because they are related to the killer.
17
9 See infra notes 18-31 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 32-61 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 62-105 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 106-121 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 122-154 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 155-181 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 182-202 and accompanying text.
16 See, Mary Louise Fellows, The Slayer Rule: Not Solely a Matter of Equity,
71 IowA L. REv. 489, 528 (1986) (arguing that the slayer rule should be recognized
as integral to the regulation of property transfers, rather than as an equitable ap-
pendage to the law of property).
17 See infra notes 203-206 and accompanying text.
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II. THE SLAYER RULE
A. Origins and Historical Development of the Slayer Rule
The slayer rule's genesis is rooted in the principle, "Nullus
Commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria-No man can take
advantage of his own wrong." 18 The rationale for the slayer rule is
the prevention of unjust enrichment coupled with the maxim that a
wrongdoer cannot profit from his or her wrong. 19 At early common
law, the feudal doctrines of attainder,20 corruption of blood,21 and
forfeiture of estate 22 addressed whether a killer may profit from his
wrongful act or succeed to his victim's property.23 These feudal doc-
trines were prohibited under the federal Constitution and largely
abolished by the states. 24
The cornerstone of the slayer rule in the United States ap-
peared late in the nineteenth century in the New York decision of
Riggs v. Palmer.25 In Riggs, the testator's grandson killed the testa-
tor in order to accelerate his inheritance and prevent the testator
from disinheriting him.2 6 The court ordered the devise and bequest
in the will to [the grandson] Elmer ineffective to pass the title to
him.., and that since he killed his grandfather, he was deprived of
18 See Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889). This common-law rule was
first extended to a slayer-beneficiary in England in 1892. See also Alison Reppy,
Note, The Slayer's Bounty - History of Problem in Anglo-American Law, 19
N.Y.U. L. REV. 229 (1942) (citing Cleaver v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, [1892]
1 Q.B. 147 (Eng. C.A.)).
19 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 8.4 (Tentative Draft No. 3, April 4, 2001).
20 "Attainder" is defined as follows: "at common law, the act of extinguish-
ing a person's civil rights when sentenced to death or declared an outlaw for com-
mitting a felony or treason." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 314 (6th ed. 1990).
21 "Corruption of the blood" is defined as follows: "a former doctrine, now
considered unconstitutional, under which a person loses the ability to inherit or
pass property as a result of an attainder or of being declared civilly dead." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 49 (Pocket Ed. 1996).
22 "Forfeiture" is defined as follows: "the act or process of losing a right,
privilege, or property because of a crime, breach of obligation, or neglect of duty."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 264 (Pocket ed. 1996).
23 See generally Reppy, supra note 18, at 233 (discussing the common law
origins of the modern equitable doctrine).
24 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 ("No Attainder of Treason shall
work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture, except during the Life of the Person
attainted.").
25 See Riggs, 22 N.E. at 188. See also Fellows, supra note 16, at 490.
26 22 N.E. 188.
700 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XIX
any interest in the estate. 27 Since Elmer was precluded as a benefi-
ciary under his grandfather's will 8 his share passed to the testator's
two daughters, subject to the support of Elmer's mother during her
lifetime. 29 In this case, where the killing was motivated by economic
greed, the court utilized an equity theory in concluding that it was
unreasonable for a murderer to benefit when such laws were passed
for the "orderly, peaceable, and just devolution of property. ' 30 The
Court's decision is rooted in English law and is the historical foun-
dation for the theory that no legal system can permit a person to
assert a right derived from a crime that they committed. 31
B. Principles and Policies Supporting the Slayer Rule
1. Equity and Morality
The foundation of the slayer rule is based on the principles of
equity, morality, and property law. 32 The principle of equity means
that "the social interest served by refusing to permit the criminal to
profit by his crime is greater than that served by the preservation of
legal rights of ownership. '33 Permitting a killer to take his victim's
property vindicates his wrongful acts. 34 For example, in Garwols v.
Bankers Trust Company,35 a stepson, driven by greed, killed his
stepmother to inherit her wealth and use it to persuade a woman to
marry him.36 The court ruled that the slayer could not inherit from
his stepmother. The court's reasoning was that to permit a slayer to
benefit from his act would be contrary to public policy, and thus no
devisee could take under the will of the testator whose death had
been caused by the criminal act of the devisee himself.37 This is logi-
cal, for if a court allowed a killer to profit from his wrongful act it




30 Id. at 190.
31 See Kent S. Berk, Mercy Killing and the Slayer Rule: Should the Legisla-
tures Change Something?, 67 TUL. L. REV. 485, 497 (1992).
32 See Adam J. Katz, Comment, Heinzman v. Mason: A Decision Based on
Equity but Not an Equitable Decision, 13 QUINN. PROB. L.J. 441, 450-56 (1999).
33 John W. Wade, Acquisition of Property by Willfully Killing Another - A
Statutory Solution, 49 HARV. L. REV. 715, 715-16 (1936).
34 See Fellows, supra note 16 at 492.
35 232 N.W. 239 (Mich. 1930).
36 Id. The motive for killing has been considered essential in some cases. See
also Fellows, supra note 16, at 492.
37 See Garwols, 232 N.W. at 242.
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ance contract 38 or permitting a will beneficiary who fraudulently in-
duced a will to take under that will. 39
In addition, the equity principle underlying the slayer rule
raises morality issues.40 The moral justification for precluding kill-
ers the right to succeed to their victim's property differs with the
circumstances. 41 The "moral justification for denying slayers the
right to succeed to their victims' property is indisputable in those
cases in which greed motivates the killings. '42 Therefore, both the
Riggs43 and Garwols44 courts reached the proper moral conclusion
in denying these killers the benefit of the very laws they attempted
to circumvent. 45 The moral principles denying the killer's right to
benefit are not disturbed in the absence of motivation by economic
gain.46 For example, in Leavy, Taber, Schultz, and Bergdahl v. Met-
ropolitan Life Insurance Company,47 a wife killed her husband after
drinking and arguing.48 Despite the fact that the wrongdoer is not
motivated by greed, courts and legislatures prevent these wrongdo-




Coupled with the principles of morality and equity, to preserve
a rational property transfer system, a slayer should not be able to
profit from his wrongful act.50 Killers interrupt the regular disposi-
tion of property in three ways: First, the victim's death causes her to
lose enjoyment of her personal property; second, the killings in
some cases deny victims an opportunity to revise their existing es-
tate plans; and third, the killings interrupt the order of death of the
38 Fellows, supra note 16, at 493. This analogy was first used in New York
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591, 600 (1886), and relied upon in many
later decisions. See, e.g., Riggs, 22 N.E. at 190.
39 See Fellows, supra note 16, at 493 (citing Dean Ames, Can a Murderer
Acquire Title by His Crime and Keep It?, 45 AM. L. REG. & REV. 225, 231-232.
(1897)).
40 Berk, supra note 31, at 498.
41 See id. at 496.
42 Fellows, supra note 16, at 491-92.
43 22 N.E. 188.
4 232 N.W. 239.
45 See Fellows, supra note 16, at 493.
46 Id. at 494.
47 581 P.2d 167 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978).
48 Id.
49 Id.; see also, Fellows, supra note 16, at 494.
50 Fellows, supra note 16, at 494.
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victims and slayers, thus placing property transfers conditioned on
survivorship in jeopardy of being controlled by surviving slayers.51
These consequences interrupt the notion of free and unencumbered
transfer of one's property.52 Thus, a state must deny a slayer's suc-
cession to the victim's property in order to prevent interference
with property transfers.
5 3
In addition, every person has a right to inherit.5 4 The slayer's
act is offensive from the standpoint of property law only because it
"frustrates intentions we are otherwise disposed to honor. '55 The
slayer rule is designed to preserve our property-transfer system's
integrity; it prevents a person from altering, the intended course of
property succession by means of a wrongful slaying.5 6 Thus, the es-
sential goal of the slayer rule is to attempt to distribute the victim's
property according to her intent, as though the killing had not
occurred. 57
3. Deterrence Policy
The public policy consideration that, "a person may not law-
fully do that which tends to injure the public,"58 supports the exis-
tence of a slayer rule. One of the slayer rule's multiple purposes is
to prevent unjust enrichment and to discourage people from com-
mitting harmful acts to their community. 59 For example, by denying
the slayer any of the benefits that flow from his act, one who might
kill could be less inclined to act. Thus, the slayer rule has an effect
on deterring economically motivated killings. 60 Therefore, it is not
51 Id. at 504.
52 See Katz, supra note 32.
53 Fellows, supra note 16, at 494.
54 See Julie J. Olenn, Comment, 'Til Death Do Us Part. New York's Slayer
Rule and In Re Estates of Covert, 49 BuFF. L. REV. 1341 (2001) (citing Jeffrey G.
Sherman, Note, Mercy Killing and the Right to Inherit, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 803, 848-
56 (1993)).
55 Jeffrey G. Sherman, Mercy Killing and the Right to Inherit, 61 U. CIN. L.
REV. 803, 861.
56 Id. at 860.
57 See generally Fellows, supra note 16; see also In re Estate of Sparks, 15
N.Y.S.2d 926 (Sur. Ct. 1939).
58 Berk, supra note 31, at 495 (citing F.F. Thomas, Jr., Public Policy as Af-
fecting Property Rights Accruing to a Party as a Result of Wrongful Acts, 1 CAL. L.
REV. 397 (1913)).
59 See id. at 496.
60 Id.
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surprising that states widely embrace either common-law slayer
rules or legislative statutes as an effective means to deter crime. 61
C. Narrowness of Slayer Statutes
The law that prevents a slayer from profiting from his wrongful
act appears in two forms depending on the jurisdiction. While many
states utilize a slayer statute other states rely on common law rule. 62
However, despite the different forms, the principles underlying the
common law rule are essentially the same as those embodied in the
statutory law of other jurisdictions. 63 Along with developing com-
mon law slayer rules, many states have promulgated statutes that
prohibit a killer from inheriting his victim's property. The purpose
of these statutes, commonly known as "slayer statutes", is to pro-
hibit the slayer from benefiting from his wrongful act. 64 Slayer stat-
utes are a portion of descent and distribution law.
Today, almost all states have enacted some kind of slayer stat-
ute prohibiting killers from profiting from their wrongful act either
through wills, testamentary substitutes, or intestacy. 65 Although
states vary with respect to the situations they cover, such as insane
killers, acquitted killers, self-defense killers, and non-intentional
killers, and to the provisions made for the disposition of the interest
that would have otherwise gone to the murderer, 66 they are all uni-
fied by similar themes, such as the principles of equity, morality,
rational property transfer, and the public policy consideration of
deterrence. 67
1. Uniform Probate Code Section 2-803
Most states have statutes that resemble the Uniform Probate
Code.68 These state statutes essentially deny a slayer any benefit he
61 See id.
62 See Olenn, supra note 54, at 1347 (citing Sherman, supra note 55, at 847).
63 Olenn, supra note 54, n.3.
64 See Katz, supra note 32, at 444 (citing Ronald R. Volkmer, Slayer Statutes
Applied In Different Situations, 23 EST. PLAN. 139 (1996)).
65 See id.
66 WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS
§ 17.19 (3rd ed. 2001).
67 See id.
68 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 211,211-12. The
relevant part of the statute reads:
(b) [Forfeiture of Statutory Benefits] An individual who feloni-
ously and intentionally kills the decedent forfeits all benefits under
2003] 703
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would have received under his victim's estate.69 Consequently, the
decedent's estate is transferred as if: (1) the decedent previously
nullified that portion of his estate originally left to the slayer; (2)
the benefiting slayer died before the victim; or (3) the murdering-
beneficiary forfeited his share.70
The method by which a slayer is prevented from taking under
his victim's estate usually takes one of two possible forms:7' either
legal title is considered as never having vested in the killer but as
this Article with respect to the decedent's estate, including an intes-
tate share, and elective share, an omitted spouse's or child's share,
a homestead allowance, exempt property, and a family allowance.
If the decedent died intestate, the decedent's intestate estate passes
as if the killer disclaimed his [or her] intestate share. (c) The feloni-
ous and intentional killing of the decedent:
(1) revokes any revocable (i) disposition or appointment of
property made by the decedent to the killer in a governing
instrument,
(2) severs the interests of the decedent and killer in property
held by them at the time of the killing joint tenants with
right of survivorship, transforming the interests of the de-
cedent and killer into tenancies in common ....
(3) Provisions of a governing instrument are given effect as if
the killer disclaimed all provisions revoked by this section
or, in the case of a revoked nomination in a fiduciary or
representative capacity, as if the killer predeceased the de-
cedent. (f) A wrongful acquisition of property or interest
by a killer not covered by this section must be treated in
accordance with the principle that a killer cannot profit
from his wrong. (g) After all right to appeal has been ex-
hausted, a judgment of conviction establishing criminal ac-
countability for the felonious and intentional killing of the
decedent conclusively establishes the convicted individual
as the decedent's killer for purposes of this section. In the
absence of a conviction, the court, upon the petition of an
interested person, must determine whether, under the pre-
ponderance of evidence standard, the individual would be
found criminally accountable for the felonious and inten-
tional killing of the decedent. If the court and determines
that, under that standard, the individual would be found
criminally accountable for the felonious and intentional
killing of the decedent, the determination conclusively es-
tablishes that individual as the decedent's killer for the
purposes of this section.
Id.
69 See id.
70 Berk, supra note 31, at 493.
71 See BOWE & PARKER, supra note 66, at 847.
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having passed instead directly to the persons who take in his
place;72 or legal title is passed to the killer pursuant to the devise or
intestate laws under a constructive trust.73 A constructive trust 74 is
imposed on the killer and he is the trustee ex maleficio for the per-
sons who take in his place.
75
2. Insane Killers
Despite the various methods used to prohibit a killer from
profiting from his wrongful act, each state's common law rule or
statute is narrowly construed to include only a select group of kill-
ers.76 For example, some jurisdictions across the nation have stat-
utes that permit a slayer to inherit from his victim's estate on the
grounds that the slayer was insane.77 For example, in Estate of
Ladd, an insane mother killed her two teenaged sons and was al-
lowed to inherit from their intestate estates.78 The court reasoned
that since the mother was insane at the time of the murders, she was
not capable of acting "unlawfully" or "intentionally" for purposes
of that section of the probate code. 79 Other courts have articulated
that an insane person does not do wrong, and thus does not profit
from wrong when he inherits.80
Finally, other courts have reasoned that in a civilized society,
we recognize insanity as a defense against punishment for crime be-
cause the perpetrator is mentally diseased to the extent that he does
not have the requisite culpable mental state that the law seeks to
punish.81 So, in a case where a killer benefits from his unlawful act,
such as unintentional diseased mind killing, it cannot be concluded
72 See id.
73 See id.
74 A "constructive trust" is defined as follows: "a relationship with respect to
property subjecting the person by whom the title to the property is held to an
equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that his acquisition or reten-
tion of the property is wrongful, and that he would be unjustly enriched if he were
permitted to retain the property." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 637 (Pocket ed.
1996).
75 See BowE & PARKER, supra note 66, at 847.
76 See, e.g., id.
77 See, e.g., Michael G. Walsh, Annotation, Homicide as Precluding Taking
Under the Will or by Intestacy, 25 A.L.R.4TH 787 (2000).
78 Estate of Ladd, 153 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Ct. App. 1979).
79 Id.
80 See, e.g., In re Estate of Brumage, 460 So. 2d 989 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984).
81 See Campell v. Ray, 245 A.2d 761 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1968).
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that he perpetrated the act with the intent to profit.82 In such cir-
cumstances, if it was not his will to act or kill, it does not follow that
he has committed a wrong barring him from receiving benefits that
arise solely because of the unintended death of an individual.83 Ab-
sent any expression by the legislature in this area, it was not against
the public policy of the state to permit one who had killed while
insane to subsequently take a share of the decedent's estate. 84 Thus,
despite the variations of reasoning between the state courts, the es-
sential ingredient of each state's slayer statute or rule is that the
slayer acted with mental culpability when he committed the act. By
excluding insane killers, jurisdictions narrow those it considers to be
slayers.
3. Non-intentional Killers
Many jurisdictions hold that a killer who did not intentionally
kill, but instead was convicted of a lesser charge such as manslaugh-
ter or negligence, is allowed to take under his victim's estate. 85 In In
re Wolf, a husband killed his wife while attempting to shoot his
wife's lover; the court noted that under the statute of descent and
distribution, the husband would be entitled to a distributive share in
the wife's personal property unless the facts of the case constituted
a legal or equitable bar.86 Recognizing that intent is the very es-
sence of the equitable principle, the court concluded that the hus-
band was not barred from succession under the statute of
distributions because he did not intend to kill his wife and profit by
her death.87 The court ultimately charged the husband with man-
slaughter, and not murder.88 The court observed that had the hus-
band been indicted for manslaughter at common law, the
indictment would have charged, "he did feloniously kill and slay his
wife" not that "he did feloniously, willfully, and of malice afore-
thought kill and murder her." 89 Again, the omission of killers that




85 Walsh, supra note 77.
86 See Campell v. Ray, 245 A.2d 761 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1968).
87 Id. at 743.
88 Id. at 742.
89 Id. at 742-43.
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statute represents the statute's strictness and aim to preserve its
founding principles and policies.
4. Self-Defense Killers
In addition, several jurisdictions do not apply slayer rules and
statutes to those who killed in self-defense. 90 For example, in Ward
v. Ward, the jury acquitted a widow, on her plea of self-defense, for
the shooting death of her husband. 91 The court concluded that she
had not forfeited her right to take from her husband's intestate es-
tate.92 Although the wife did kill her husband, her motive was not
to obtain his estate. 93 Also, evidence proved that her husband had a
reputation for having a violent temper when drinking.94 Further,
the facts illustrated that he came at her with something in his hand
while cursing and threatening her, and that she had fired at him in
the dark when she found it impossible to retreat to safety. 95 The
self-defense exclusion shows, once again, that the slayer statute re-
mains narrow due to a continuing effort to punish a select group of
killers.96 Thus, it is consistent with the multiple principles and poli-
cies upon which it was founded.
97
5. Acquitted Killers
While state jurisdictions are split as to whether an acquittal al-
lows a slayer to take under his victim's estate, 98 the jurisdictions
that do allow a slayer to take reason that, once an acquittal is
granted, a retrial is unnecessary in civil probate litigation.99 For ex-
ample, the court in Wilson v. Wilson,100 stated that once the wife's
innocence had been affirmatively determined it should not be re-
tried.1°1 The court said that it had to assume, nevertheless, that the
legislature was aware of the difference in the degree of proof neces-
90 See Walsh, supra note 77.
91 Ward v. Ward, 6 S.E.2d 664 (Va. 1940).
92 Id. at 665-66.
93 Id. at 665.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 See generally BOWE & PARKER, supra note 66, at 847.
97 See id.
98 See Walsh, supra note 77.
99 Id.
100 144 Cal. Rptr. 180 (Ct. App. 1978) (holding that the acquittal of the dece-
dent's wife in a jury trial on the charge of murdering her husband was conclusive
and that she was entitled to take from her late husband's estate).
101 Id. at 184.
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sary to convict in a criminal case and that necessary to prove a civil
cause of action. 102 "The policy against having duplicate and endless
litigation of the same issue seemed to have been reasonably bal-
anced by the legislature against the possible denial to some litigants
in civil cases of their individual right to prove a cause of action
against an alleged wrongdoer."' 03 ,
These examples are a representation of killers that do not fall
under the definition of a slayer. They are all related because in each
case the killer was deemed not to be a wrongdoer. 04 Thus, they
were also not wrongdoers for the purposes of the principles and
policies embodied in the slayer rule, and therefore slayer rules and
statutes will not prohibit them from taking under their victim's
estate.105
III. GUILTY BY ASSOCIATION
A. In Re Estates of Cover
Currently, nearly all state jurisdictions have either a well-de-
fined slayer statute or a common-law rule.' 0 6 However, as courts
hear more and more cases involving inter-family killings, in many
cases innocent members of the slayer's family are being denied
their share of the victim's estate simply due to their relationship
with the slayer. 10 7 This extension of the slayer rule, to include inno-
cent members of the killer's family, violates the principles and poli-
cies upon which the slayer rule was founded. Further, it is
inconsistent with the narrow group of killers that are precluded
from taking under their victim's estate.
One example of this is in the New York case of In re Estates of
Covert.10 8 On April 3, 1998, Edward M. Covert shot and killed his
wife, Kathleen L. Covert. 10 9 Approximately three minutes later he
ended his own life. A joint will executed by the husband and wife in
1995 provided that, upon the death of the first spouse, the surviving
spouse was to inherit all of the property. 10 Upon the death of the
102 Id. at 185.
103 Id.
104 See, e.g., BOWE & PARKER, supra note 66.
105 See id.
106 See Berk, supra note 31, at 495.
107 See e.g., In Re Estates of Covert, 761 N.E.2d 571 (2001).
108 Id.
109 Id. at 574.
110 Id.
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survivor, certain specified property was to pass to the wife's sister,
and the balance of the estate was to be divided with a one-third
share to pass to each spouse's parents and the remaining one-third
share evenly divided among their siblings.11'
The residuary beneficiaries who are members of the wife's
family requested that the property pass only to them due to the
circumstances of their daughter's death." 2 The husband's family
members who are also residuary beneficiaries moved for distribu-
tion of the assets of the husband and wife pursuant to the will.
113
The Surrogate's Court directed that the wife's property and the
couple's joint property pass to the wife's estate, and disqualified the
Coverts from taking due to the circumstances of her death. 114 The
husband's property, on the other hand, was directed to his estate to
be distributed pursuant to the provisions of the will.' 15
On appeal, the court concluded that due to the will's singular
provision that the couple's property was to be distributed to the
same beneficiaries in the same proportions regardless of which
spouse died first, the husband's parents cannot be precluded from
taking under their joint will. 116 The court held, that while the lower
courts were correct, under New York's slayer rule, in preventing the
husband and his estate from profiting from his wrongdoing, they
erred by disqualifying the Coverts from taking their share of the
wife's estate that they otherwise would have received as her benefi-
ciaries. 17 The court concluded that as the Coverts are among the
named beneficiaries of the wife and are not themselves wrongdoers,
the doctrine that the wrongdoer and the wrongdoer's estate may
not profit from the death of the victim would not disqualify them
from receiving their shares of the wife's estate as contemplated in
her will." 8 Nor will a forfeiture of the wrongdoer's own property
occur under these circumstances, because the Coverts will share in
the same proportions as beneficiaries of the wife as they would
have as beneficiaries of the husband.119 Ultimately, through the ap-
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119 Id. at 576.
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Coverts to take, as beneficiaries of the joint will. However, this case
is only one example of a novel issue that is now facing many courts
and leaving them to struggle with whether to preclude rightful ben-
eficiaries of a victim from taking because of their relationship to the
slayer.1 20
Currently, because state statutes do not specifically address the
rights of a slayer's family as beneficiaries of the victim, some juris-
dictions are treating them as punishable just like the slayer himself
and denying them their rightful shares of the victim's estate. Ulti-
mately, this results in decisions that fail to recognize the relation-
ship between the rule and its underlying principles and policies.
This is wrong because in essence it is punishing the slayer's family
simply due to their familial relationship with the slayer. It also rep-
resents a clear violation of the purposes and policies underlying the
slayer rule because it is punishing people for who they are instead
of what they did or did not do. This extension of the rule to include
innocent family members of the slayer in turn results in the rule
losing its narrowness and goal of punishing only the truly culpable
and guilty killers.' 2'
B. The Relationship Between the Slayer Rule and its Underlying
Policies and Principles
The principles of equity, morality, property law and deterrence
policies that make up the underpinnings of the slayer rule would be
violated if family members of the slayer were prohibited from tak-
ing from the victim's estate merely because of their familial rela-
tionship to the killer. 22 The underlying policy purpose of the slayer
rule that a person should not profit from his wrongful act is meant
to deter homicide. 123 However, if the statute is extended to pre-
clude family members of the slayer from taking, it does nothing to
bolster the deterrence effect. 24 For example, the rule often does
not apply to the innocent successors of a slayer who committed sui-
cide, since the killer stands to gain nothing by his act and the deter-
120 See, e.g., In re Estate of Benson, 548 So.2d 775.
121 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803; see also BOWE & PARKER, supra note
66.
122 See generally BOWE & PARKER, supra note 66.
123 See, e.g., Katz, supra note 32, at 451.
124 See, e.g., Luecke v. Mercantile Bank of Jonesboro, 691 S.W.2d 843 (Ark.
1985).
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rence effect is lost.125 In Luecke v. Mercantile Bank of Jonesboro,
the court declined to extend the constructive trust remedy to the
children of a man who had killed his wife and then himself. 126 The
Supreme Court of Arkansas reasoned that the public policy behind
the slayer rule is founded upon the theory that the killer himself
intends to profit and that that is the reason he murdered. 127 How-
ever, when he subsequently commits suicide, he does not profit
from his act and thus he could not have committed the act with the
intent to profit.128 Therefore, the rule of public policy does not ap-
ply at all. 129 The court stated, "When the reason for the application
of the rule does not exist the rule cannot be invoked."
130
In addition, after examining the facts, the Luecke court con-
cluded that the slayer's children were not profiting from their fa-
ther's wrongful act.131 Therefore, the children were not precluded
from taking as beneficiaries of their mother's estate. 132 The court's
reasoning is equally applicable to slayer's relatives in cases where
the slayer does not subsequently commit suicide. 133 In these factual
scenarios, the slayer will be prohibited from profiting from his act
to satisfy the deterrence policy and the principles of equity and mo-
rality.134 However, the slayers children or relatives would not be
excluded from taking, as they did no wrongdoing in the first place
that needs to be punished.135 Family members of the slayer are usu-
ally innocent of any wrongdoing in connection with the victim's
death. Therefore, if they are precluded from taking, no further pol-
icy purpose is gained. 136 The Uniform Probate Code slayer statute
remains inadequate by failing to explicitly state that a slayer's fam-
ily is not precluded from taking.
137
Legislatures and courts alike have maintained a very narrow
and limited definition of the class of people that are included in the
125 See id.
126 Id.







133 See Katz, supra note 32, at 470.
134 See generally Fellows, supra note 16.
135 See Luecke, 691 S.W.2d at 846.
136 See id.; see also Katz, supra note 32, at 470.
137 See generally BOWE & PARKER, supra note 66.
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term "slayer" and are thereby prohibited from taking from the vic-
tim's estate. 138 Thus, in order to maintain consistency with the stat-
ute, the same reasoning used to exclude all of these non-
wrongdoers should also be used in accessing a slayer's family. By
applying this reasoning to a slayer's family, it will logically deter-
mine that they are also not wrongdoers and, therefore, outside the
scope of the current class. The current class of people defined in the
Uniform Probate Code Section 2-803 that forfeit statutory benefits
from killing include, individuals who feloniously and intentionally
kill the decedent. 139 As discussed previously, this definition is nar-
row and limits itself to only a select group of killers.140 For example,
an insane person is allowed to take from his victim's estate because
he is mentally diseased to the extent that he does not have the req-
uisite intent to commit the crime, which is an element of the crime
that the law seeks to punish. 41 Thus, because the killing was com-
mitted without intent due to the diseased mind, the killer did not
commit the act with profitability in mind. 142
In addition, many statutes including the Uniform Probate
Code do not include slayers who acted in self-defense in the narrow
definition. 43 The underlying policies and principles of the slayer
rule are not applicable to self-defense killers because they did not
perpetrate their acts to obtain the victim's estate.144 Therefore, self-
defense killers are omitted from the group of people barred from
taking from their victim. 45
Further, accused killers that are eventually acquitted of their
acts are also not barred from taking from their victim. 146 Allowing
acquitted killers to be barred from taking would directly oppose the
founding purpose of the slayer rule and would essentially be equally
as harmful as barring a slayer's family member from taking.147 Both
categories of people are innocent.148 Therefore, the maxim that "no
man can take advantage of his own wrong" which lies at the foun-
138 See id.
139 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803.
140 See BOWE & PARKER, supra note 66.
141 See Campbell v. Ray, 245 A.2d 761; see also Walsh, supra note 77.
142 See Ray, 245 A.2d at 761.
143 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803.
144 See Ward v. Ward, 6 S.E.2d 664; see also Walsh, supra note 77.
145 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803.
146 Id.
147 See BOWE & PARKER, supra note 66.
148 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803.
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dation of the slayer rule would not apply because acquitted killers
have been proved by a court of law to have done no wrong in the
first place.149 Thus, once innocence has been proven, the slayer,
under equity, is able to take his share of the victim's estate.
150
Finally, the Uniform Probate Code also states that a killer who
committed his act with any culpability less than intentional, such as
a conviction of the lesser charge of manslaughter, is not prohibited
from taking under his victim's estate. 151 Because the killer did not
have the required intention of killing and profiting from his victim's
death, which is the very essence of the equitable bar, in equity the
slayer ought not to be barred from succession under the statute of
distributions. 152 The reasons supporting the exclusion of these cate-
gories of killers from the class of people the statute strictly prohibits
from taking under the victim's estate are similar.153 Thus, the same
reasoning should be used to determine that the slayer's family
should also not be precluded as rightful beneficiaries under the vic-
tim's estate. 154
C. Counter Arguments
Several arguments have been offered to support denying the
slayer's family their shares of the victim's estate. However, each
falls short of being a legitimate reason. For example, the slayer's
family is personally innocent of the killing therefore, the rationale
for extending the rule beyond the slayer cannot be that the distribu-
tees of the slayer's estate are also wrongdoers. 155 In addition, the
rationale cannot be that the slayer's act "accelerates the enjoyment
of the victim's property."' 56 Any distributee of the victim's estate
will be benefited in that manner. Ultimately, to deny a slayer's fam-
ily from taking would defeat the rule and its main purpose to punish
only those that are truly culpable and guilty of their acts.
157
149 See id.; see also Reppy, supra note 23 (citing Cleaver v. Mut. Reserve Fund
Life Ass'n [1892] 1 Q.B. 147 (Eng. C.A.).
150 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803; see also Reppy, supra note 23.
151 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803.
152 See In re Wolf, 150 N.Y.S. 738; see also Walsh, supra note 77.
153 See generally BOWE & PARKER, supra note 66.
154 See id.
155 Fellows, supra note 16, at 494.
156 Id.
157 See generally BOWE & PARKER, supra note 66; see also UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 2-803.
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"The beneficiaries of the slayer's estate may be considered un-
deserving possibly because of a notion that the victim, in response
to the killer's act, would have prevented the slayer's heirs or will
beneficiaries from enjoying the property had the victim had the op-
portunity to change the estate plan. ' 158 This reasoning fails in those
cases where the victim had no power to change the disposition. 159
In addition, it precludes individuals who are also the natural objects
of the slayer's bounty from taking directly from the victim's estate
as well as through the slayer's estate. 60 For example, in Bates v.
Wilson, Robert J. Bates shot and killed his parents, Dr. J.C. Bates
and Ethel P. Bates, however the court decided that Barbara Jo
Bates, granddaughter of the victims and daughter of the killer, was
allowed to take her share of the victim's estate.161 The court rea-
soned, "I cannot believe that it was the intention of the Legislature
of Kentucky to deny the right to inherit the estate to an innocent
child, even though the child is a daughter of the person who com-
mitted the murder. The trial court reasoned that, to so hold in this
case is to punish a baby who could not have counseled, advised or
influenced her father in the. commission of his crime, and takes
from her the inheritance to which she is entitled."'' 62 States typically
have not extended the slayer rule to encompass individuals who are
natural objects of the slayer's bounty and who also take directly
from the victim's estate. 163 This reasoning rests on the notion of
fairness to innocent persons. 64
There is a possible distinction to make between what to do
when a person dies testate or with some form of testamentary sub-
stitute, or when a person dies intestate. 65 When a person dies tes-
tate, he has previously affirmatively chosen the distribution of his
property and his intended takers. 66 Thus, it would be hard for a
court to supercede his dispositive intent by not allowing his benefi-
ciaries to take. For, in the victim's testamentary document, the in-
tent and beneficiaries are clearly identified. Therefore, if a court
denied the victim's wishes, it would be assuming the testator would
158 Fellows, supra note 16, at 494.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Bates v. Wilson, 232 S.W. 2d 837 (Ky. 1950).
162 Id. at 838.
163 Fellows, supra note 16, at 495.
164 Id.
165 See id. at 527-28.
166 See id.
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not have wanted the beneficiary to inherit despite his clear written
intent. Indeed, the testator probably would most likely want the
killer's innocent family members to take regardless of the act of the
slayer.
However, if the person dies intestate, he never affirmatively
stated his intent with regard to the disposition of his property. 167
Therefore, he might not have wanted these innocent family mem-
bers to inherit in the first place whether the killing had taken place
or not. Arguably, this distinction is invalid because just as it is
wrong to deviate from a written will where dispositive intent is
clearly shown, when a court deviates from the intestacy statute, it is
in essence writing a will for the victim. This scenario is equally as
harmful and presumptuous to the victim's wishes. When a victim
does not leave a will or testamentary substitute, the courts are
presented with a more subjective inquiry as to the proper remedy.
For example, in In re Estate of Benson, a man murdered his mother
and brother and the court struggled with what to do with the
brother's intestate estate. 168 The victim's sister urged the court to
deny the killer's children their inheritance from their grandmother
and uncle and instead to pass it directly to her.169 The court con-
cluded that to reach this result they would have to supercede the
express terms of Margaret Benson's will, and Florida's Anti-Lapse
Statute. 170 Further, they rejected her argument that there exists a
public policy in Florida that would extend Florida's Slayer Statute
so as to disinherit the natural and or statutory heirs of a killer who
except for his murderous act would have been a beneficiary of his
victims' estates. 171
The strongest argument for denying the killer's family from
taking under the victim's estate is to prevent the slayer from con-
trolling the disposition of the victim's property through death time
transfers. 172 Therefore, the beneficiaries or heirs of the slayer's es-
tate should be subject to the slayer rule because it prevents the
slayer from directly benefiting from his wrongdoing. 173 When the
slayer cannot control the disposition, any indirect benefit that re-
167 See id.
168 In re Estate of Benson, 548 So.2d 775.
169 Id. at 777.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 See Fellows, supra note 16, at 495.
173 See id.
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sults from allowing the natural objects of the slayer's bounty to take
from the victim's estate does not warrant precluding these innocent
individuals.1 7
4
In addition, some courts reason that if they allowed the slayer's
family to take under the victim's estate, it would be allowing the
slayer indirectly to benefit from the killing. 175 For example, in Ben-
nett v. Bettis, a husband and wife purchased a joint life insurance
policy where the husband's mother was named as a contingent ben-
eficiary. 176 Thereafter, the husband murdered his wife and the hus-
band was disqualified as the primary beneficiary. 177 The court
stated the legislative purpose was to allow the victim's estate, which
consisted of the victim's children to receive the insurance benefits
which would have been forthcoming at common law, rather than
produce a result which turned the funds over to the killer's mother
who would have the power to place all or part of those funds back
in the killer's hands. 178 The court also held that the wife's duty to
support her children equitably trumped any interest of the killer's
mother even in the face of a conflicting statutory provision
designating her as a beneficiary. 179
It has also been suggested that a court should not allow a
slayer's family member to take from his victim's estate, as the slayer
might have committed the act in order to benefit his heirs.180 Al-
though this is a possible analysis, it is highly improbable due to the
fact that such a gift is incredibly costly to the slayer. 181
Without a definitive statute provision to establish whether a
killer's innocent family can take under the victim's estate, courts
are left to hypothesize as the correct remedy. To alleviate this prob-
lem and maintain consistency with the current rule the Uniform
Probate Code should add a new section to its current slayer rule
specifically addressing the rights of a slayer's family.
174 Id. See, e.g., In re Estate of Safran, 306 N.W. 2d 27, 37 (1981) (holding
slayer's unborn issue, who were named in mother's will as contingent beneficiaries
in event slayer predeceased mother, could not take because their interests were
too remote; court indicated in dicta it would disqualify natural objects of the
slayer's bounty because otherwise slayer would indirectly benefit from killing).
175 See Fellows, supra note 16, at 524.
176 Bennett v. Bettis, 722 A.2d 115 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).
177 Id.
178 Id. at 117.
179 Id. at 118.




IV. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE UNIFORM PROBATE
CODE'S SLAYER STATUTE
Full consideration of current slayer statutes and rules coupled
with their founding principles and policies prove that it is improper
for a court to extend the statutory definition of slayer to encompass
the slayer's innocent family. 182 The slayer rule was adopted based
on the principle of preventing unjust enrichment. 83 This prevents a
sl3,er from profiting from his wrong, but should not prohibit bene-
ficiaries of the victim, who are also related to the slayer, from tak-
ing under the victim's estate merely because of their familial
relationship to the slayer.1 84 Therefore, in order to prevent further
inequitable decisions, the Uniform Probate Code must add a provi-
sion to its current statute that explicitly alleviates the ambiguity of
whether to include slayer's family in the class of people that are
prohibited from taking under the victim's estate.
The new section that should be added as an amendment to the
current Uniform Probate Code statute should address the inheri-
tance rights of the slayer's family under the victim's estate. The new
section should state:
(H) [Rights of the Slayer's family to take under the Victim's es-
tate]. Takers receiving benefits under the victim's will, tes-
tamentary substitute, or in intestacy including those that
also hold a familial relationship with the slayer, will not be
prohibited from taking their respective shares of the vic-
tim's estate merely because of their relationship to the
slayer. A court will presume that all takers under the es-
tate are innocent of any involvement in the death of the
victim. Thus, they will not be prohibited from taking their
share either through intestacy or by devise.
However, the victim's family may challenge a benefici-
ary's innocence in a court of law. If the victim's family can
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the benefi-
ciary played a role in the victim's death either by (1) fail-
ing to prevent the act from happening, or (2) aiding in the
killing of the victim, the individual forfeits all benefits
182 See Katz, supra note 32.
183 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 8.4 (Tentative Draft No. 3, April 4, 2001).
184 Id
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under this Article with respect to the decedent's estate,
including an intestate share, and elective share, an omitted
spouse's or child's share, a homestead allowance, exempt
property, and a family allowance. If the victim died intes-
tate, the decedent's intestate estate passes as if the guilty
disclaimed his [or her] intestate share.
The most important reason this proposed section must be ad-
ded to the Uniform Probate Code is that it will alleviate much of
the judicial uncertainty regarding the rights of family members of
the slayer.185 The proposed section sets forth a clear and precise
rule for courts to follow that will inevitably aid in enforcing sound
and equitable judgments. 186 Further, by establishing an exact rule in
this area, the courts' validity will be bolstered, as they will no longer
be relying on subjective opinions but rather on well-defined objec-
tive rules. 1
87
The proposed section is also in line with the Uniform Probate
Code's current narrow and limited class of killers that are prohib-
ited from taking under the victim's estate. 188 Using the same rea-
soning that the courts and legislatures applied to exclude many
types of killers, innocent family members of the slayer should also
be excluded. Simply barring a person to take from the victim's es-
tate due to their familial relationship with the killer is inequitable
and wrong as a matter of policy.189 The killer's family members
should not be denied from benefiting, because they are not profit-
ing from their individual wrongdoing, which is the equitable and
moral principle that lies at the foundation of the slayer rule. 190 Fur-
ther, by excluding them, they are not serving any public policy of
deterrence since they did not act wrongly. 19' Finally, in many cases,
they were unaware or unable to prevent the killer's acts. 192 Thus, if
they were barred from taking from the victim's estate, in essence,
we would be punishing them for who they are instead of what they
did or did not do.'
93
185 See, e.g., In re Estates of Covert, 761 N.E.2d 571.
186 See id. See also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803.
187 See, e.g., In re Estates of Covert, 761 N.E.2d 571.
188 See UNiF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803.
189 See generally BOWE & PARKER, supra note 66.
190 See Wade, supra note 33, at 715-16.
191 See Berk, supra note 31, at 495.
192 See, e.g., In re Estates of Covert, 761 N.E.2d 571.
193 See id.
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Although the majority of cases will involve innocent takers, the
proposed section also recognizes the inevitable situation of when a
taker is involved in the death of the victim. Therefore, the proposed
section leaves room for possible litigation if the victim's family feels
strongly that any taker, including the killer's family members, was
either directly or indirectly involved in the victim's death. Under
the first subsection, the family member would have failed to pre-
vent the act from happening. Although under criminal law and tort
law a person is not liable for his failure to act, this proposed section
is justified in establishing that one's inaction will cause him to lose
his share of the victim's estate. 194 This is coherent with the slayer
statute for several reasons.
For example, imagine a situation where the killer had repeat-
edly told his sister that he intended to kill his wife next month. The
killer's sister, knowing this information then took no action such as
calling the police or warning her sister-in-law and thus ultimately
failed to prevent her sister-in-law's death. By looking at the under-
lying purposes and principles of the slayer statute, it is coherent that
the killer's sister should be barred from taking under the victim's
estate. First, by barring her from taking, the equitable maxim that
no one should profit from his wrongdoing is enforced. 195 In this
case, the killer's sister knew about the upcoming act and thus, by
her inaction, profited from her sister-in-law's death. Further, the
deterrence effect of the slayer rule is also realized by not allowing
the killer's sister to take under the victim's estate.1 96 Punishing the
sister for her inaction serves as a means of general prevention, in
that the next person who might fail to disclose an upcoming murder
will possibly change his mind by the example of punishing the sister
who had not been law abiding.
Under the second subsection, the slayer's family member
would be prohibited from taking for aiding in the killing of the vic-
tim. This situation appears to be an obvious conclusion because
they would be deemed just as culpable as the slayer himself if they
participated or aided in the killing.' 97 .Further, this factual situation
would probably arise much more infrequently because in all
194 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.3 (3rd ed. 2000).
195 See Riggs, 22 N.E. 188; see also Reppy, supra, note 23.
196 See Berk, supra note 31, at 495.
197 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803.
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probability they would have already been tried under criminal
law.1 9
8
For both of these exceptions to the general rule of allowing
family members of the slayer to take under the victim's estate, the
appropriate standard of proof is a preponderance of evidence. 199 A
preponderance of evidence standard is utilized in civil proceedings,
where, as here, there is no possibility of loss of liberty through in-
carceration. At most, the guilty party will suffer a grave financial
loss. 200 A preponderance of the evidence standard requires the trier
of fact "to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than
its nonexistence before he may find in favor of the party who has
the burden to persuade the judge of the fact's existence."'20 1 Quanti-
fied, the preponderance standard means that a layman, on the basis
of all available facts, would be able to reach the conclusion that the
individual in question had engaged in either aiding or failing to pre-
vent the victim's death.20 2
V. CONCLUSION
The question of whether to deny a slayer's family member
their rightful inheritance from the victim's estate is not likely to dis-
appear any time soon. State courts will continue to struggle with the
issue in the absence of a definitive codified rule. This in turn will
result in decisions that violate the very principles and policies of the
slayer rule. 203 No state will be an exception.
Recognizing that the slayer statute's inadequacies are here to
stay, courts are left to decipher what is proper and are beginning to
express a valid concern regarding the impending resolution of the
matter.204 The proposed statutory solution set forth in Part III is the
beginning toward the answer and an attempt at a guarantee of equi-
table results and fairness to the innocent members of the slayer's
family. While, at the same time, the proposed statute recognizes
198 See LAFAVE, supra note 194, at § 6.7.
199 The "preponderance of evidence standard" is defined as follows: "the
greater weight of the evidence; the burden of proof in a civil trial, in which the jury
is instructed to find for the party that, on the whole, has the stronger evidence,
however slight the edge may be." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 494 (Pocket ed.
1996).
200 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371-72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
201 Id.
202 See id.
203 See Katz, supra note 32, at 450-56.
204 See, e.g., In re Estates of Covert, 761 N.E.2d 571.
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that it is never an absolute to say members of the killer's family
should always be able to take under the victim's estate, the door is
left slightly open for possibilities of litigation.
As long as there is no definitive codified law to allow the
killer's family to take from the victim, innocent people will be de-
nied their rights under either a specific state's intestacy statute or
the testator's testamentary wishes simply due to their relationship
with the slayer. The family members' denial strictly conflicts with
the principles and policies upon which the original rule was
founded.20 5 In addition, it diminishes the significance of the slayer
rule itself by shifting it from a narrow statute that includes a limited
number of individuals to opening it expansively. 20 6 Thus, the integ-
rity of the rule itself would be significantly lost.
Would we rather deny an innocent grandson his right to inherit
from his grandfather after his father killed him, or recognize his
innocence and allow him to take from his grandfather's estate? If
given an opportunity to discuss the question, the constituents of the
states would likely recognize that the question is deceptively simple.
Just as it would be unwise to jail the grandson for his father's acts, it
is unwise to punish him by denying him his rightful inheritance. The
clearer and more definitive our distribution-codified law is, the
more effectively we will be able to protect an individual's rights to
inherit what is rightfully theirs to take. Until then, the ambiguity in
this area will continue to haunt us in the form of inequality and
blatant interference with testamentary rights.
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